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Abstract
Performance-sensitivity of compensation schemes for portfolio managers is well ex-
plained by classic principal-agent theory as a device to provide incentives for managers
to exert effort or bear the cost of acquiring information. However, the majority of
compensation packages observed in reality display in addition a fair amount of con-
vexity in the form of performance-related bonus schemes. While convex contracts may
be explained by principal-agent theory in some rather specific situations, they have
been criticized, both by the financial press as well as the academic literature, on the
grounds that they may lead to excessive risk-taking. In this paper, we show that con-
vex compensation packages, though likely to be myopically not optimal, may serve as a
device to extract information about the ex-ante uncertain type of portfolio managers.
Optimal contracts are thus determined by the trade-off between maximizing short-run
expected returns on one hand, and long-run informational benefits on the other. In
a discrete-time model, combining dynamic principal-agent theory with the theory of
learning by experimentation, we characterize optimal incentive schemes and optimal
retention rules for fund managers, consistent with empirical observations.
JEL Classification: C61, D82, D83, G11
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1 Introduction
Compensation contracts between investment funds or banks and their portfolio managers in
recent years have become a focus of attention for both academic research as well as public
interest. Principal-agent theory addresses the design of optimal compensation contracts in
the context of the moral hazard or adverse selection problems that result from the non-
verifiability of the actions taken by the agent or the unobservability of the agent’s type.
Compensation contracts serve as mechanisms to provide incentives for the agent to exert
effort or to acquire costly information. Therefore, the compensation received by the agent
must depend on some verifiable measure of performance which, in the case of portfolio
management, is typically given by the return achieved on the managed portfolio.
However, the overwhelming majority of compensation packages observed in reality consist
of a flat base salary plus an optional bonus which is paid only if the manager’s performance
exceeds some given benchmark. In other words, the compensation received by the manager
is typically a (weakly) convex function of the performance measure, much like the pay-off
of a call option, see for example Oyer (1998). In the existing principal-agent literature,
there are essentially two situations in which optimal compensation contracts may turn out
to be convex: First, if the agent’s preferences exhibit a higher level of risk-aversion than
the principal’s, convexity may be required to align the agent’s preferences with those of
the principal. Second, if the agent incurs increasing marginal dis-utility of exerting effort,
(or increasing marginal cost of acquiring information,) optimal contracts may be convex to
provide appropriate incentives. For example, in a model in which the dis-utility of effort
is given by a convex function, Stoughton (1993) shows that optimal contracts are in fact
quadratic. However, in cases where the agent’s actions affect both the mean and the variance
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of outcomes, convex incentive schemes will most likely induce excessive risk-taking. For
example, in a model in which the agent can choose among investment projects of different
risk, Lambert (1986) shows that contracts designed to extract effort in fact lead to over-
investment in the risky project.
In this paper, we take a different approach to determining the structure of optimal compen-
sation contracts for portfolio managers. Rather than viewing compensation schemes merely
as devices to extract effort, we focus on their informational aspects. In doing so, we com-
bine the principal-agent literature with the theory of learning by experimentation. More
specifically, we show how convex compensation contracts may serve as devices to extract
information about the agent’s ex-ante uncertain type, despite the fact that such contracts
may lead to excessive risk-taking and thus may not be optimal myopically.
Evidence for persistent differences in relative fund performance has been found, among
others, by Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), and Gruber
(1996). Moreover, Chevalier and Ellison (1998) find significant differences in performance
even on the level of individual managers. In other words, certain portfolio managers seem
to possess superior skill in selecting optimal portfolios, or have better access to private
information. In our model, such differences in skill or information will be reflected in the
manager’s type. We postulate that the effect of type on performance will be stronger the
higher the level of risk involved. The intuition is that private information obviously plays a
stronger role when investing in high-risk stocks rather than, say, Treasury securities. One
might argue that at the same time as higher risk increases the effect of the agent’s type on
performance, it also makes the information contained in observed performance more noisy.
While this certainly creates an interesting trade-off for the principal, it will not be the focus of
the analysis developed here. In this paper, we show how compensation schemes can be used
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to make portfolio managers reveal their true type by inducing them to invest aggressively.
Obviously, this informational benefit comes at a cost, since the portfolios chosen by managers
under such incentive schemes may not be optimal in the short run. Thus, the long-run
informational benefits of compensation schemes are traded off against the loss incurred by
deviations from short-run optimality. This type of trade-off is the characterizing feature of
the literature on “learning by experimentation”; see for example Aghion, Bolton, Harris,
and Jullien (1991) or Keller and Rady (1999). It is worth noting that the results developed
in this paper do not only apply to portfolio management. In any principal-agent situation
in which agents’ types have an effect of performance that becomes more pronounced with
the risk taken, the principal faces the same type of trade-off between the benefits and the
cost of experimentation.
Casual observations made on the trading floors of large banks seem to suggest that these
banks indeed offer extremely aggressive bonus schemes especially to more junior portfolio
managers. While this may seem irrational at first, this paper offers the explanation that such
bonus schemes may be used as screening devices to separate the “good” portfolio managers
from the “bad” ones. Empirical evidence in support of this explanation is manifold: Both
Benston (1985) and Khorana (1996) report a significantly negative relationship between
performance and management turnover, which indicates that performance is indeed used
as a screening device. Moreover, Khorana (1996) finds that return risk increases prior to
the replacement of a manager. While most authors attribute this observation to “window
dressing” or “herd behaviour” as studied by Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991)
and Scharfstein and Stein (1990), our paper reverses the direction of causality: It is not the
impending threat of dismissal that causes managers to take on more risk, but instead the
increase in risk makes dismissal more likely.
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We develop a disctrete-time, infinite-horizon model in which risk-neutral agents (portfolio
managers) may be hired by a single, risk-averse principal to manage the principal’s invest-
ment funds. Contracts between an agent and the principal last for one period and specify
the compensation that the agent receives, contingent on the return achieved. Agents are of
different types according to their ability to forecast returns, but types are not observable by
the principal ex ante. Instead, the principal forms beliefs about the agent’s type, conditional
on observed returns. Based on these beliefs, the principal may decide to fire and replace
the agent at the end of any period. In other words, management turnover is endogenously
determined on the basis of performance. This adds to the existing literature on learning
by experimentation, where the environment in which learning takes place is either fixed or
changes exogenously. To keep this paper short, we restrict the analysis to the case in which
the compensation scheme is fixed over time. The implications of allowing the principal to
adjust the contract according to the evolution of beliefs is dealt with in a second, forthcom-
ing paper. We will however mention the corresponding results whenever we believe them
to be of interest. While hired by the principal, agents will choose a portfolio strategy such
as to maximize expected future compensation, taking into account the possibility of being
fired. The principal on the other hand chooses a compensation scheme and firing rule such
as to maximize expected utility.
There have been numerous studies that focus on principal-agent interactions in dynamic
environments, for example Radner (1985), Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom (1986), or
Laffont and Tirole (1988), to name but a few. However, the majority of these analyze
the design of optimal compensation contracts in the presence of moral hazard or adverse
selection problems, without addressing the principal’s decision whether to retain or replace
agents. The latter in turn has been studied in Radner (1986), and Banks and Sundaram
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(1998). However, in these models the compensation contract is taken as exogenously given,
and the focus lies entirely on the optimal retention rule. In particular, the only incentive
mechanism is the threat of being fired, which plays only a marginal role in our paper. To the
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to combine dynamic adverse selection with the
theory of learning by experimentation to simultaneously address the questions of optimal
contract design and optimal retention. We thus add to the existing literature by showing
how the principal can use compensation contracts not only as incentive mechanisms but
also to control the informativeness of observed outcomes. Optimal contracts are determined
by the trade-off between maximizing the efficiency of the retention rule on one hand, and
maximizing short-run expected returns on the other.
We classify compensation schemes according to the risk of the portfolio chosen by the agent.
More specifically, by an “aggressive” contract we mean one that induces agents to select
high-risk portfolios, while a “conservative” contract induces agents to invest in lower-risk
assets. In the context of the compensation packages observed in reality, the more convexity
is contained in a contract, the more aggressive it is. Myopically, in the absence of any long-
run benefits from learning, the optimal contract will most likely be conservative. In other
words, aggressive schemes can be optimal only on grounds of their potential informational
advantages, despite their myopic inferiority.
In our model, the problem of moral hazard is largely eliminated, since the assumed return
distribution permits writing contracts that determine the agent’s actions unambiguously.
However, the principal faces a problem of adverse selection since the agent’s type is ex-ante
unknown. We show that “separating” contracts, which are accepted only by good agents and
rejected by bad ones, are generally not feasible. In other words, any contract designed to be
accepted by good agents will necessarily also be attractive to bad ones. Thus, the first-best
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outcome for the principal is generally not implementable. In fact, while in equilibrium good
agents will receive no more than their reservation utility, bad agents may extract additional
rents. In other words, to ensure that good agents are willing to accept the contract, the
principal faces agency costs in form of paying “too much” to bad agents.
As a consequence, good agents act myopically , despite the risk of being fired. We believe
this to be an accurate albeit slightly stylized description of the observation that investment
funds or banks are known to be very reluctant to disclose the reasons for replacing a portfolio
manager, since this would cast a bad light on their own reputation. Indeed, Jensen and
Murphy (1990) report that “penalties associated with dismissals are very small”. However,
since bad agents can extract extra rents from being employed by the principal, the threat
of being fired creates an incentive for bad agents to mimic good ones. In order to deter bad
agents from doing so, they must be compensated for the loss they incur when fired. This
constitutes additional agency costs the principal will have to bear.
Due to the informational asymmetry between good and bad agents, the behaviour of bad
agents will be more sensitive with respect to the type of compensation package offered. More
specifically, an aggressive contract is most likely to make bad agents take on excessive risk,
while the behaviour of good agents is largely unaffected. But bad agents, by definition, are
the ones most likely to produce inferior returns when investing aggressively. Therefore, if
it was not for any potential informational benefits, the principal would always be better off
choosing a conservative contract. On the other hand however, bad agents are more likely to
reveal their type when they invest aggressively. In fact we show that the more severe the
myopic inferiority of aggressive contracts, the higher their informational advantage. Thus,
the principal must trade off short-run utility maximization against long-run informational
benefits.
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We show that the dynamics of the agent’s type and the principal’s beliefs can be described
by a Markov process on a discrete state space. This enables us to quantify explicitly the
informational benefits of different contracts, and to establish necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for certain types of contracts to be optimal. We derive comparative statics results
relating the type of optimal contract to various parameters of the model: First, aggressive
contracts are more likely to be optimal the higher the unconditional expected return on the
risky assets, since this makes the aggressive scheme “less costly” in terms of expected utility,
while its informational content remains unchanged. Second, aggressive contracts are less
likely to be optimal the higher the level of the principal’s risk-aversion, since risk-aversion
increases the utlity loss of aggressive contracts. Finally, aggressive contracts are more likely
to be optimal the higher the likelihood of picking a good agent at random. In other words,
if it is easy to find good agents, it is worth bearing the cost of experimentation to detect
and fire bad agents as soon as possible.
Although a formal treatment of the dynamic case in which the principal is allowed to change
the offered contract is deferred to a subsequent paper, we believe some of the the results
to be worth mentioning here. As discussed earlier, aggressive contracts are more useful
when the uncertainty about the agent’s true type is high. Therefore, the optimal dynamic
compensation scheme typically starts off with an aggressive contract and becomes more
conservative as the principal grows more confident regarding the agent’s type.
The predictions of this paper are consistent with the empirical evidence: First, our results
suggest that compensation schemes should be more aggressive in market segments in which
returns are more risky. Also, compensation packages should be more aggressive whenever
there is higher uncertainty regarding portfolio managers’ true ability. This argument may in
fact be reversed to estimate the level of uncertainty perceived by market participants from
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the types of contracts observed. Finally, our results suggest that compensation schemes
should be more aggressive for more junior portfolio managers and become increasingly con-
servative with increasing seniority. This is consistent with the observation that bonuses make
up a much higher fraction of total salary packages for younger portfolio managers, while se-
nior managers often receive very high base salaries and their bonuses are often guaranteed.
Moreover, consistent with the predictions of our paper, turnover is much higher amongst
junior portfolio managers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; Section 2 outlines the model and in-
troduces the notation. In Section 3, we characterise the dynamics of the principal’s beliefs
under different assumptions regarding the agent’s strategies. Conditions under which these
types of strategies are indeed optimal are derived in Section 4. Combining the results of the
two preceding sections, we characterize optimal first-best and second-best contracts in Sec-
tion 5, and establish conditions under which experimentation (deviations from the myopic
optimum) is optimal. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Trading takes place at discrete times t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . By “period t” we mean the time
interval from time t up to time t+ 1. Two assets are traded, a risk-free “bond” which yields
a deterministic gross return R0 per period, and a risky asset. In any given period t, the risky
asset yields a random return R(t) which is realized at the end of the period. The distribution
of R(t) depends on the outcome of some exogenous factor S(t). While S(t) might be known
to some agents at time t, it is not publically observable and cannot be contracted upon.
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Since S(t) conveys information about the distribution of R(t), we will refer to it also as
the period-t “signal”. For expositional clarity, we will consider a very simple specification
of the return distribution and information structure. While the results developed in this
paper can be shown to hold even in much more general scenarios, we believe that the simple
specification outlined below allows better insight into the mechanisms behind those results.
2.1 Information Structure and Return Distribution
In any given period t, the gross return R(t) on the risky asset takes on one of three given
values, R−, R0, or R+, with R− < R0 < R+. The signal S(t) on the other hand is assumed
to take on either of two values, S− or S+. We call S− the “bad signal” and S+ the “good
signal”. For k ∈ {−,+} denote by qk the unconditional probability that S(t) = Sk, and for
j ∈ {−, 0,+} let qkj be the probability that R(t) = Rj, conditional on S(t) = Sk. To simplify
matters further, we make the
Assumption 2.1 A good outcome can only occur following a good signal, while a bad out-
come is only possible when the signal was bad. Formally,
q+− = 0, and q
−
+ = 0.
Consequently, we can represent the distribution of returns by a simple two-stage binomial
lattice (Figure 1). This assumption in particular implies that observing either R(t) = R− or
R(t) = R+ reveals the signal with certainty. Although this is a somewhat “extreme” feature
of the model, preliminary results using “trinomial” branching indicate that the qualitative
conclusions of this paper remain true also in more general scenarios.
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Figure 1: Binomial Model of Return Distribution
To conclude this section, let q∗j for j ∈ {−, 0,+} denote the unconditional probability of
outcome R(t) = Rj. Evidently,
q∗+ = q+ · q++, q∗0 = q+ · q+0 + q− · q−0 , and q∗− = q− · q−−.
Let ER(t) denote the unconditional expected return in period t. Note that we do not
necessarily assume ER(t) > R0. In other words, we do not require a risk-premium on
“unhedged” returns. The intuition for this is that the downside risk inherent in R(t) can be
avoided by informed agents upon observing S(t).
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2.2 Agents
There is a continuum of risk-neutral agents, and any given agent can be either of type θb or
of type θg. We refer to agents of type θg as “good” agents and to those of type θb as “bad”
agents. Denote by pi0 the unconditional probability that any randomly chosen agent is of
type θg. The difference in agents’ types concerns their skill in acquiring information about
the return on the risky asset. We think of good agents as having better access to private
information or as possessing superior skills in interpreting public information. We model
this by making the
Assumption 2.2 Good agents observe the signal S(t) at the beginning of each period t,
while bad agents do not possess any additional information.
Consequently, good agents base their investment decisions on the conditional return distribu-
tion qkj , given the observed signal S(t) = Sk, while bad agents “know” only the unconditional
distribution q∗j . While this assumption again may seem extreme, relaxing it makes the model
far less tractable. Numerical simulations seem to indicate however that the results of this
paper remain true under more general specifications, as long as good agents possess some
informational advantage in forming return predictions.
Agents may be hired by the principal to manage the principal’s investment portfolio. If
employed in any given period t, an agent chooses a portfolio by investing a fraction α(t) of
the available funds in the risky asset and the remaining 1− α(t) in the risk-free asset. We
restrict α(t) to take values in [0, 1], that is we do not allow short sales. The portfolio return
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realized at the end of the period is hence
Z(t) = R0 + α(t) (R(t)−R0) . (1)
We assume that the agent’s choice α(t) is not verifyable, so that compensation contracts
can be written on returns only. This is consistent with the majority of contracts observed in
reality, where compensation schemes for portfolio managers typically consist of a flat base
salary plus an optional return-dependent bonus. More specifically, a compensation contract
is a non-negative, non-decreasing function w : IR−→IR, so that the compensation received
by the agent in period t is given by w (Z(t)). Let U i0 denote the value of the outside option
for an agent of type θi. Since agents are risk-neutral, they will choose a strategy α(t) such
as to maximize expected future income,
U i = E
[ T−1∑
t=0
βtw (Z(t)) + βTU i0
]
, (2)
where β is the agent’s co-efficient of time preference, and T is the number of periods the agent
remains employed (we do not rule out the case T = ∞). Note that T is ex-ante random,
since the principal’s decision whether or not to replace the agent depends on realized returns.
2.3 Principal
Denote by θ(t) the true type of the agent hired by the principal during period t. The principal
cannot directly observe θ(t), but forms beliefs pi(t) based on the available information. More
specifically, pi(t) is the subjective probability that θ(t) = θg. At the end of period t, the
principal observes the portfolio return generated by the agent, Z(t), and updates beliefs
accordingly. The principal may then choose to fire and replace the agent.
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The principal’s preferences are given by a time-separable, non-decreasing, weakly concave
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function v : IR−→IR. In other words, the principal will
choose a compensation scheme and a firing rule such as to maximize expected utility
V = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtv (Z(t))
]
, (3)
where β is the principal’s co-efficient of time-preference. Note that in a slight abuse of
notation, we use the same symbol β for both agent and principal, without postulating that
they be necessarily equal. Note also that we do not require the utility function v to be
strictly concave, that is we do not rule out the case where the principal is risk-neutral.
3 Dynamics of Beliefs
In this section, we will characterize the dynamics of the principal’s beliefs, pi(t), under various
assumptions regarding the strategies chosen by agents of either type. More specifically, for
i ∈ {b, g} and k ∈ {−,+} let αik denote the portfolio that would be chosen by an agent of
type θi after having observed signal Sk. Obviously, since only good agents observe the signal,
we have to impose the restriction αb+ = α
b
− =: α
b on bad agents’ strategies. Throughout
this section, we will take the agent’s strategies as given and analyze the resulting dynamics
of beliefs. The circumstances under which certain strategies are in fact optimal will be
addressed in the next section. We begin by classifying possible strategy combinations.
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Definition 3.1 (Classification of Strategies) A good agent’s strategy (αg+, α
g
−) is called
“normal” if αg+ > α
g
−, and “standard normal” if α
g
+ = 1 and α
g
− = 0. Moreover, a bad
agent’s strategy αb is called . . .
(a) “aggressive mimicking” if αb = αg+ 6= αg−, and
(b) “conservative mimicking” if αb = αg− 6= αg+.
Finally, we call a bad agent’s strategy “separating” if it is not mimicking.
In other words, a good agent’s strategy is normal if a larger fraction of the avialable funds
is invested in the risky asset upon receiving a good signal than in the case of a bad signal.
The distinction of bad agents’ strategies determines the informativeness of observed returns,
which we will discuss in greater detail in the following sections.
3.1 Bayesian Updating of Beliefs
For the remainder of this section we will assume that good agents always play the standard
normal strategy, while bad agents follow either of the mimicking strategies. More specifically,
by the “Aggressive Regime” we mean the case in which the good agent follows a standard
normal and the bad agent an aggressive mimicking strategy, and by “Conservative Regime”
the analogous case with conservative mimicking. We will discuss later (see Section 4) the
circumstances under which these strategies are indeed optimal. Note that in either regime,
the only possible return outcomes are the “primitive” returns, i.e. Z(t) ∈ {R−, R0, R+}. For
i ∈ {b, g} and j ∈ {−, 0,+} denote by pij the probability of observing outcome Z(t) = Rj
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conditional on the agent being of type θi. Tables 1 and 2 list these probabilities for the two
regimes.
Proposition 3.2 (Belief Updating) Suppose the principal’s beliefs at the beginning of pe-
riod t are pi(t). The Bayesian posterior, conditional on observing outcome Z(t) = Rj, is then
given by Tjpi(t), where the updating operator Tj is defined as
Tjpi :=
pi
pi + κj(1− pi) ,
with κj := pbj/p
g
j , and κj = +∞ whenever pgj = 0.
Proof: Bayes’ Rule.
Remark: The likelihood ratio κj determines the direction in which beliefs are updated.
More specifically, κj > 1 implies Tjpi < pi, while κj < 1 implies Tjpi > pi. Intuitively, κj > 1
corresponds to a return outcome which is more likely to be generated by a bad agent rather
than a good agent (pbj > p
g
j ). Hence, observing such an outcome makes it less likely that the
agent is of the good type, so that beliefs are corrected downwards (Tjpi < pi). The converse
is true for κj < 1. Also note that κj = 0 implies Tjpi = 1, and κj = +∞ implies Tjpi = 0.
These cases correspond to outcomes which reveal the agent’s type with certainty. Tables 1
and 2 summarize the updating mechanics for the two regimes.
3.2 Markovian Dynamics of Beliefs and Types
We wish to describe the dynamics of the system in terms of a Markov process. From Tables
1 and 2 we see that the transition probabilities of beliefs depend not only on current beliefs,
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j pgj p
b
j κj Tjpi
+ q+ · q++ q+ · q++ = 1 = pi
0 q+ · q+0 + q− q+ · q+0 + q− · q−0 < 1 > pi
− 0 q− · q−− +∞ = 0
Table 1: Belief Updating, Aggressive Regime
j pgj p
b
j κj Tjpi
+ q+ · q++ 0 = 0 = 1
0 q+ · q+0 + q− 1 > 1 < pi
− 0 0 — —
Table 2: Belief Updating, Conservative Regime
pi(t), but also on the agent’s true type, θ(t). Since therefore we cannot expect the process
of beliefs alone, pi(t), to be markovian, we have to consider instead the bivariate process of
types and beliefs, (θ(t), pi(t)). To characterize the dynamics of this process, we will proceed
in two steps: First, we consider the case in which the principal hires an agent once and for
all, i.e. θ(t) ≡ θ(0) for all t. Second, we determine the principal’s optimal policy of firing
and replacing agents and analyse the manner in which this affetcs the dynamics of beliefs
and types.
From Tables 1 and 2 we see that any outcome other than Z(t) = R0 either produces no
information at all (Tjpi = pi), or reveals the agent’s type with certainty (Tjpi ∈ {0, 1}).
Hence, starting from any arbitrary belief pi, the only possible values for the updated beliefs
are pi itself, T0pi or the extreme values zero and one. Motivated by this observation, we define
pin := T n0 pi0 =
pi0
pi0 + (κ0)n(1− pi0) for n = 0, 1, . . .
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A suitable state space on which beliefs “live” is hence given by E := {0, 1} ∪ {pi0, pi1, . . . }.
Note that the pin will be different in the two regimes. More precisely, we find that pin+1 > pin
in the aggressive regime, while pin+1 < pin in the conservative regime. The intuition behind
this is straight-forward: In the conservative regime, outcome Z(t) = R0 is more likely to
come from a bad agent, hence beliefs are shifted towards the bad type. Conversely, in the
aggressive regime, outcome Z(t) = R0 is more likely to be produced by a good agent, and
beliefs are accordingly adjusted upwards.
We show in the appendix (Proposition A.1) that the process (θ(t), pi(t)) of types and beliefs
is indeed a Markov process on the state space {θb, θg} × E. The transition probabilities
are depicted in Figures 2 and 3. Evidently, the most informative event in the conservative
regime is observing a high return Z(t) = R+. This is so because in this regime bad agents
invest conservatively and will hence always produce a portfolio return of R0. Thus, observing
a high return reveals with certainty that the agent is of the good type. Conversely, in the
aggressive regime, observing a low return Z(t) = R− is most informative because a good
agent would never have invested in the risky asset upon receiving a bad signal. In other
words, in the conservative regime it is the good agents who reveal their type by producing
high returns, while in the aggressive regime it is the bad agents revealing their type through
poor performance.
It should be noted that although revelation with certainty is a consequence of the discrete
return distribution, the qualitative properties of different regimes will remain the same even
under a continuous distribution: it will always be the case that high returns in a conservative
regime indicate a good agent, while low returns in an aggressive regime indicate a bad one.
However, we view the existence of separating regimes as a pure artifact of the discrete
distribution which is not only extremely unrealistic but also not robust with respect to
17
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Figure 2: Dynamics of Beliefs and Types, Aggressive Regime
different distributional assumptions. Therefore, we discard the separating regimes and focus
entirely on the mimicking regimes.
3.3 Hiring and Firing
In either regime, returns generated by good agents are always at least as high as those
generated by bad agents. Therefore, we expect the principal’s value function to be increasing
in current beliefs pi(t), (for a formal proof, see Proposition 5.4.) On the other hand, whenever
a new agent is hired, beliefs will be reset to the initial prior, pi0. Therefore, it is optimal for
the principal to fire and replace the agent if and only if the posterior belief after observing
the most recent return falls below pi0.
We show in the appendix (Proposition A.2) that if the principal follows this firing strategy,
the process (θ(t), pi(t)) of types and beliefs is indeed a Markov process. The transition
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Figure 3: Dynamics of Beliefs and Types, Conservative Regime
probabilities are depicted in Figures 4 and 5.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section, which characterizes the dynamics
of expected beliefs. Throughout the remainder of the paper, we will use an index m ∈ {a, c}
to indicate either the aggressive (m = a) or the conservative (m = c) regime, respectively.
Theorem 3.3 In regime m, the unconditional expectation of the principal’s beliefs can be
expressed in the form E [ pi(t) ] = 1− λtm (1− pi0), where
λa = 1− q∗−pi0 in the aggressive regime, and
λc = 1− q∗+pi0 in the conservative regime.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
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Figure 4: Dynamics of Beliefs and Types, Aggressive Regime with Firing/Hiring
Corollary 3.4 Since pi(t) is the conditional distribution of θ(t) given the principal’s infor-
mation, the law of iterated expectations implies P [ θ(t) = θg ] = 1− λtm (1− pi0).
The co-efficient λm measures the benefit from learning: the lower λm, the shorter the average
time it takes the principal to find a good agent. From the definition of λm, we can identify two
distinct effects: First, λm is lower the higher the probability of hiring a good agent, pi0. This
simply reflects the fact that it is easier to pick a good agent by chance the higher the fraction
of good agents is in the total population. Second, λm is also lower the higher the probability
of the event that reveals the agent’s type with certainty, (q∗− in the aggressive regime, and q
∗
+
in the conservative regime.) In other words, the aggressive regime performs better in finding
a good agent whenever q∗− is large in comparison with q
∗
+, that is whenever low returns
are more likely than high returns. On the other hand, the higher the probability of low
returns, the higher the principal’s loss of expected per-period utility when bad agents invest
aggressively. Thus, the principal must trade off the informational advantage of the aggressive
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Figure 5: Dynamics of Beliefs and Types, Conservative Regime with Firing/Hiring
regime against its inferiority in terms of myopic utility maximization. This fundamental
trade-off, typical for models of learning by experimentation, will determine which type of
regime is optimal.
4 Compensation Contracts and Portfolio Selection
In this section, we characterize the optimal strategies for agents of either type. We will es-
tablish necessary and sufficient conditions regarding the compensation scheme offered by the
principal which ensure that certain strategy combinations are optimal. From the preceding
section, we know that for a fixed compensation scheme, the probability of being fired does
not depend on the principal’s beliefs. Therefore, we can restrict our analysis to stationary
strategies, i.e. those which depend only on the agent’s type and the observed signal. In
other words, a good agent’s strategy is entirely characterised by the pair (αg+, α
g
−) of port-
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folio choices conditional on the observed signal, while a bad agent’s strategy is simply given
by the unconditional portfolio choice αb. For what follows, we fix a given compensation
scheme w. For k ∈ {−,+}, denote by wk(α) the expected compensation if the agent chooses
portfolio α, conditional on signal Sk. Evidently,
wk(α) = qkk · w (R0 + α(Rk −R0)) + qk0 · w (R0) .
Finally, denote by w(α) the unconditional expected compensation,
w(α) = q+ · w+(α) + q− · w−(α).
4.1 Good Agents
Let us fix a given strategy αb followed by the bad agent. We wish to characterize the optimal
strategy for the good agent, given the compensation scheme offered by the principal. Denote
by U g(α+, α−) the good agent’s value function for a given strategy (α+, α−), and let U
g
0
denote the value of the good agent’s “outside option”.
Proposition 4.1 The good agent’s value function solves the functional equation
U g(α+, α−) = q+ · w+(α+) + q− · w−(α−) + β {νU g0 + (1− ν)U g(α+, α−)} , (4)
where ν denotes the probability of being fired in any given period.
Remark: The firing probability ν depends of course also on the strategies chosen by both
types of agent. More specifically, ν = pg0 whenever α+ = αb, and ν = 0 otherwise.
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Obviously, the agent will only be willing to work for the principal if the expected utility of do-
ing so is at least as high as the agent’s outside option, U g0 . In other words, the compensation
scheme offered by the principal must satisfy the participation constraint
sup
α+,α−
U g(α+, α−) ≥ U g0 . (5)
On the other hand, the principal will seek to find the “cheapest” contract which satisfies
this constraint, so that the constraint will be binding at the optimum. In other words, in
equilibrium good agents will be indifferent between the outside option and working for the
principal. We are now ready to characterize the good agent’s optimal strategy.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose the compensation scheme is chosen such that
q+ sup
α+
w+(α+) + q− sup
α−
w−(α−) ≡ (1− β)U g0 . (6)
Then the participation constraint (5) is satisfied with equality, and any α∗+ and α
∗
− that attain
the suprema in the above expression are optimal, i.e.
U g(α∗+, α
∗
−) = sup
α+,α−
U g(α+, α−) = U
g
0 .
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
This theorem simply states that good agents will act myopically , i.e. choose a strategy
(α+, α−) such as to maximize the expected per-period compensation. In other words, the
threat of being fired is irrelevant for choosing an optimal strategy. While this is not critical
for our analysis, we believe it to be an accurate albeit somewhat stylized description of the
real world, where banks or investment funds are known to be extremely reluctant to disclose
the reasons for replacing a portfolio manager. Indeed, Jensen and Murphy (1990) report
that “penalties associated with dismissals are very small”.
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4.2 Bad Agents
Analogous to the preceding section, we fix an arbitrary strategy (α+, α−) for the good agent,
and denote by U b(α) the bad agent’s value function, and by U b0 the value of a bad agent’s
outside option. The first result is similar to the one obtained for good agents:
Proposition 4.3 The bad agent’s value function satisfies the functional equation
U b(α) = w(α) + β
{
νU b0 + (1− ν)U b(α)
}
,
where ν is the probability of being fired.
Remark: As for the good agent, the firing probability ν depends on the strategies chosen
by both types of agent. More specifically, ν = pb− whenever α = α
g
+, and ν = 1 otherwise.
Obviously, a given contract will be accepted by bad agents if and only if it satisfies the
corresponding participation constraint ,
sup
α
U b(α) ≥ U b0 . (7)
However, while any contract must necessarily satisfy the participation constraint for good
agents, this is not the case for bad agents. In fact, the principal would prefer to write a
contract which is accepted only by good agents but rejected by bad ones. However, it is
a priori not clear whether such contracts always exist. In fact we will show that if the
values of the agents’ outside options are sufficiently different across types, then the only
feasible contracts are those which are accepted by both types. Moreover, in this case only
the participation constraint for good agents will be binding. Conversely, if the participation
constraint for bad agents is binding, the contract would not be acccepted by good agents.
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In other words, the principal incurs agency costs due to the problem of adverse selection.
Before addressing this issue in more detail in the next section (Theorem 5.2), we need to
characterize bad agents’ optimal strategies:
Theorem 4.4 Suppose the compensation scheme is chosen such that
sup
α
w(α) ≥ (1− β)U b0 . (8)
Then the participation constraint (7) for bad agents is satisfied, and any α∗ that attains the
supremum is optimal if and only if
w(α∗) ≥ w(αg+) + β(1− pb−)
{
w(α∗)− (1− β)U b0
}
. (9)
Otherwise, αg+ is optimal.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
Note that the last term in (9) can be interpreted as the loss the bad agent incurs by choosing
not to mimic the good agent and thus reducing the chance of remaining employed. In other
words, to deter bad agents from mimicking good ones, they have to be compensated for the
utility loss associated with the threat of being fired. This constitutes additional agency costs
that have to be borne be the principal.
We have seen that agents’ optimal strategies are entirely determined by the conditional
expected compensations wk(α). Conversely, it is easy to see that for any arbitrary functions
fk(α), a contract w can be constructed such that wk(α) ≡ fk(α). Figures 6 and 7 show
examples of contracts that implement the aggressive respectively conservative regime. Note
however that the depicted contracts need not represent the best possible way to implement
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the respective regime. In fact, the principal will choose contracts that implement the optimal
regime while minimizing the expected cost. To relate our results to the types of compensation
schemes observed in reality, we broadly classify these schemes into
affine w(z) = a0 + a1z can be either (typically conservative)
simple bonus w(z) = a0 + b(z − z0)+ always aggressive
mixed w(z) = a0 + a1z + b(z − z0)+ can be either (typically aggressive)
In particular, affine contracts are aggressive if and only if ER(t) > R0, and conservative
otherwise. Mixed contracts on the other hand can only be conservative if ER(t) < R0. In
other words, a substantial fraction of the bonus-based compensation schemes observed in
reality classify as aggressive in the context of our model.
5 Optimal Contracts
In this section, we will study the circumstances under which certain types of contracts
are optimal from the principal’s vantage point. As discussed earlier, we believe separating
regimes to be an artifact of the discrete return distribution and as such neither realistic nor
robust with respect to changes in the distribution. Therefore, we will discard these regimes
and focus entirely on the two mimicking regimes. As before, we use an index m ∈ {a, c} to
indicate either the aggressive (m = a) or the conservative (m = c) regime, respectively. For
i ∈ {b, g} and m ∈ {a, c}, let vim denote the principal’s expected per-period utility in regime
m, given that the agent is of type θi. Evidently,
vgm = q
∗
+v(R+) + (1− q∗+)v(R0) =: vg for both m = a and m = c, while
vba = q
∗
+v(R+) + q
∗
0v(R0) + q
∗
−v(R−), and v
b
c = v(R0).
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Figure 6: Example of an Aggressive Contract
Note that it will always be the case that vg > vbm for either regime m. Moreover, if the
principal is sufficiently risk-averse, or if ER(t) < R0, we will also have vba < v
b
c. This is in
fact the most interesting case, since it implies that myopically, conservative contracts are
always optimal. In other words, in this case aggressive contracts may be optimal on grounds
of their informational benefits only, despite their myopic inferiority.
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Figure 7: Example of a Conservative Contract
5.1 First-Best
Before characterizing the optimal second-best contract, it is helpful to analyse the principal’s
value function in the first-best scenario.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose the principal can observe the agent’s type ex-ante. In this case,
only good agents are hired, and the principal’s value function is given by
V ∗ =
vg
1− β . (10)
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We will investigate below the circumstances under which it is possible to implement the
first-best outcome even if the agent’s type is not observable. More specifically, we will see
that in some cases contracts may be written that are accepted by good agents but rejected
by bad ones. In general however, we cannot expect such contracts to be always feasible.
More specifically,
Theorem 5.2 The first-best outcome can be implemented if and only if
U g0 < (1 + q−)U
b
0 . (11)
Proof: See Appendix A.4.
In other words, if the value of agents’ outside option is sufficiently different across types,
only second-best contracts are feasible. More specifically, if (11) is violated, any non-negative
compensation scheme which satisfies the participation constraint for good agents, (5), nec-
essarily also satisfies that for bad agents, (7). In fact, in equilibrium the participation
constraint will be binding only for good agents, so that bad agents can extract additional
rents at the expense of the principal. The key assumption here is non-negativity: If the
principal was allowed to write contracts that specify negative compensation at least in some
cases, the first-best outcome could always be implemented. However, since compensation
packages that require employees to pay the employer are rarely observed in reality, we main-
tain the non-negativity restriction. It is therefore essential to ask what types of second-best
contracts are optimal in cases where the first-best contract is not feasible.
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5.2 Second-Best
We begin our analysis of the second-best case by characterizing the principal’s value function
in the absence of learning. In this case, the principal faces the agency cost associated with
the unobservability of the agent’s type, without making use of the information contained in
observed returns to lower these cost.
Proposition 5.3 Without learning, the principal’s total expected utility in regime m is
V 0m = V
∗ − A0m with A0m =
1− pi0
1− β
{
vg − vbm
}
. (12)
In particular, the optimal contract in this case is aggressive if and only if vba ≥ vbc, and
conservative otherwise.
Thus, the principal’s value function in the second-best case can be decomposed into the
first-best value function, V ∗, minus the term A0m, which we may interpret as agency cost .
Note first that A0m is always positive in either regime, so that the first-best outcome indeed
dominates the second-best. Intuitively, learning should reduce agency cost; indeed we find
Proposition 5.4 With learning, the principal’s total expected utility in regime m is
Vm = V ∗ − Am with Am = 1− pi01− βλm
{
vg − vbm
}
, (13)
where λa = 1− q∗−pi0 and λc = 1− q∗+pi0 are defined as in Theorem 3.3.
Proof: See Appendix A.5.
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Note that the agency cost in this case, Am, differ from the agency cost in the case without
learning, A0m, only by the co-efficient λm. From Section 3 we know that λm measures the
benefit from learning: the higher the speed of learning, the lower λm, and the greater the
reduction of agency cost. In particular, λm = 1 corresponds to no learning at all. The size of
the agency cost is hence determined by trading off the myopic utility cost, vg − vbm, against
the benefits from learning measured by λm.
A given regime m is said to be myopically optimal if it minimizes A0m, and optimal if it
minimizes Am. Since the speed of learning varies across regimes, it is possible that the
overall optimal regime is different from the myopically optimal one. In other words, it may
be optimal for the principal to deviate from the myopic optimum whenever the cost of doing
so is outweighed by the long-run informational benefits. Such cases are referred to as optimal
experimentation. Obviously, the optimal second-best contract will be aggressive if and only
if Va > Vc, and conservative otherwise. Using Proposition 5.4, we find
Theorem 5.5 The optimal second-best contract is aggressive if and only if
1− βλa
1− βλc >
vg − vba
vg − vbc
, (14)
and conservative otherwise. The principal’s value function is given as in Proposition 5.4.
Note first that the right-hand side of (14) is greater than one if and only if the conservative
regime is myopically optimal (vbc > v
b
a), and smaller than one otherwise. Conversely, the
left-hand side of (14) is greater than one if and only if aggressive contracts possess an infor-
mational advantage over conservative ones (λa < λc), and smaller than one otherwise. The
intuitive interpretation of condition (14) is straight-forward: Suppose for example that the
conservative contract is myopically optimal. In this case the right-hand side of (14) measures
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the relative utility loss incurred by deviating from the myopic optimum, while the left-hand
side measures the informational benefits from doing so. In other words, aggressive contracts
are optimal if and only if the informational gain outweighs the cost of experimentation.
Obviously, as the principal’s level of risk-aversion increases, the right-hand side of (14)
becomes larger, so that aggressive contracts are less likely to be optimal. Intuitively, risk-
aversion increases the utility loss incurred when bad agents invest aggressively, while leaving
the informational aspects unchanged. Moreover, an increase in the proportion pi0 of good
agents in the total population will widen the gap between the co-efficients of informativeness,
λm. In particular, if aggressive contracts do possess an informational advantage, an increase
in pi0 would amplify this advantage, thus making aggressive contracts more likely to be
optimal. On the other hand, the effects of changes in the distribution of returns are not
quite so clear cut. For example, a shift in probability from q∗− to q
∗
+, (increasing the expected
return on the risky asset,) will causes both sides of (14) to decrease. Whether this change
goes in favour of aggressive or conservative contracts depends on the other parameters of the
model. However, increasing the expected return on the risky asset by raising the primitive
returns Rj, has no effect on the informativeness of different regimes while reducing the cost
of experimentation, thus making the aggressive regime more likely to be optimal.
6 Conclusion and Outlook
We show how the bonus-based compensation schemes for portfolio managers observed in
reality can be justified theoretically, despite the fact that they are known to induce excessive
risk-taking. More specifically, we characterize such bonus schemes endogenously as opti-
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mal contracts in an infinite-horizon principal-agent model in which the principal may learn
about the agent’s ex-ante uncertain type by means of “optimal experimentation”. The type
of optimal contract is determined by the fundamental trade-off between short-run utility
maximization and long-run informational benefits, which is typical for models in the theory
of learning by experimentation.
The results we derive are consistent with many of the empirical findings in the area of fund
management compensation. In particular, we provide an alternative theoretical explanation
for the surprising amount of convexity contained in most compensation packages observed
in reality that is not based on agents’ risk-aversion or dis-utility of effort. Our explanation
is consistent with the observation that management turnover is inversely related to perfor-
mance, and that the variance of returns is increased in the period prior to the dismissal.
As an obvious and important extension to the work presented in this paper, we address in
a forthcoming paper the case in which the principal is allowed to change the compensation
package offered to managers according to the evolution of the principal’s beliefs. Prelim-
inary results indicate that in addition to the static regimes considered here, there will be
a “switching regime” in which the optimal contract is aggressive at first and becomes in-
creasingly conservative as the principal becomes sufficiently confident regarding the agent’s
type. These results explain why compensation contracts are increasingly conservative as
fund managers become more senior, and why management turnover is higher amongst more
junior managers. Furthermore, we will study the case in which the principal can decide what
fraction of the available funds to allocate to the agent. Intuitively, the possibility of reducing
the stakes during the experimentation phase should reduce the cost of experimentation, thus
making aggressive contracts even more attractive.
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A Mathematical Appendix
On some suitably chosen probability space, let (S(t), R(t))t=0,1,... be a sequence of serially
independent bivariate random variables, taking values in {S−, S+} × {R−, R0, R+}, with
Prob (S(t) = Sk;R(t) = Rj) = qk · qkj ; for k ∈ {−,+} and j ∈ {−, 0,+};
and let (ϑ(t))t=0,1,... be a sequence of serially independent random variables, taking values in
{θb, θg}, with Prob (ϑ(t) = θg) = pi0.
Proposition A.1 Let S(t), R(t), and ϑ(t) be defined as above. Set pi(0) = pi0 and θ(0) =
ϑ(0). For θ(t) and pi(t) given, we define recursively:
Let α(t) = αik, where i ∈ {b, g} and k ∈ {−,+} are such that θ(t) = θi and S(t) = Sk.
Define Z(t) = R0 + α(t) (R(t)−R0) and choose j ∈ {−, 0,+} such that Z(t) = Rj. Let
pi(t+ 1) = Tjpi(t),
θ(t+ 1) = θ(t).
Then (θ(t), pi(t))t=0,1,... is a Markov process on the state space {θb, θg} × E. The transition
probabilities are as depicted in Figure 2 for the aggressive regime, and Figure 3 for the
conservative regime.
Proof: Trivial.
Proposition A.2 Let S(t), R(t), and ϑ(t) be defined as above. Set pi(0) = pi0 and θ(0) =
ϑ(0). For θ(t) and pi(t) given, we define recursively:
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Let α(t) = αik, where i ∈ {b, g} and k ∈ {−,+} are such that θ(t) = θi and S(t) = Sk.
Define Z(t) = R0 + α(t) (R(t)−R0) and choose j ∈ {−, 0,+} such that Z(t) = Rj. Let
pi(t+ 1) =
 pi0 if Tjpi(t) < pi0, andTjpi(t) otherwise.
θ(t+ 1) =
 ϑ(t+ 1) if Tjpi(t) < pi0, andθ(t) otherwise.
Then (θ(t), pi(t))t=0,1,... is a Markov process on the state space {θb, θg} × E. The transition
probabilities are as depicted in Figure 4 for the aggressive regime, and Figure 5 for the
conservative regime.
Proof: Trivial.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3
We consider the two regimes separately, omitting the index m = a, c.
Aggressive Regime: Let θ(t) be defined as in Proposition A.2. From Figure 4 it is evident
that in the aggressive regime, θ(t) is itself Markov on {θb, θg}, with transition matrix λ 1− λ
0 1
 ,
where λ = 1− pi0pb−. Let Q be the transpose of the transition matrix. It is easy to see that
Qt =
 λt 0
1− λt 1
 .
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Let µ(t) denote the distribution of θ(t) on {θb, θg}. Obviously, µ(0) = (1 − pi0, pi0)′, and
µ(t) = Qtµ(0) = (λt(1 − pi0), 1 − λt(1 − pi0))′. Since by definition, pi(t) is the conditional
distribution of θ(t) given the principal’s information, the law of iterated expectations gives
E [ pi(t) ] = P [ θ(t) = θg ] = 1− λt(1− pi0),
which was to be shown.
Conservative Regime: Let pi(t) defined as in Proposition A.2. From Figure 5 it is evident
that in the conservative regime, pi(t) is itself Markov on {pi0, 1}, with transition matrix λ 1− λ
0 1
 ,
where λ = pi0p
g
0 + (1 − pi0)pb0. Note that in the conservative regime, pb0 ≡ 1, so that we can
simplify λ = 1−pi0(1−pg0) = 1−pi0pg+. Let Q denote the transpose of the transition matrix.
Analogous to the aggressive regime, we find
Qt =
 λt 0
1− λt 1
 .
Denote by µ(t) the distribution of pi(t) on {pi0, 1}. Obviously, µ(0) = (1, 0)′, and µ(t) =
Qtµ(0) = (λt, 1− λt)′. Consequently,
E [ pi(t) ] = λt · pi0 + (1− λt) · 1 = 1− λt · (1− pi0),
which was to be shown.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Fix any arbitrary α+ and α−. Using Proposition 4.1 we find
U g(α+, α−) = q+w+(α+) + q−w−(α−)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ (1− β)U g0
+β {νU g0 + (1− ν)U g(α+, α−)} .
Hence, (1− β(1− ν)) · (U g(α+, α−)− U g0 ) ≤ 0, with equality if and only if
q+w+(α+) + q−w−(α−) = (1− β)U g0 .
This implies the desired result since β(1− ν) < 1.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.4
Using Proposition 4.3, we find
U b(α∗) = w(α∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ (1− β)U b0
+ β
{
νU b0 + (1− ν)U b(α∗)
}
.
Hence, (1−β(1− ν)) · (U b(α∗)−U b0) ≥ 0, which implies U b(α∗) ≥ U b0 since β(1− ν) < 1. To
prove the optimality condition, observe first that ν is the same for all α 6= αg+. It is hence
sufficient to compare U b(α) with U b(αg+) for α 6= αg+. Using Proposition 4.3 again, we find
(1− β(1− pb−)) ·
(
U b(αg+)− U b(α)
)
= w(αg+) + βp
b
−U
b
0 + (1− β(1− pb−))
{
w(α)− βU b0
}
.
In other words, U b(αg+) ≥ U b(α) if and only if
w(αg+) ≥ (1− β(1− pb−))w(α) + β(1− pb−)(1− β)U b0 .
Note that the right-hand side of the above inequality is just a convex combination of w(α)
and (1−β)U b0 . Hence, if α∗ = αg+, the above inequality is clearly satisfied and αg+ is optimal.
Otherwise, for α = α∗ 6= αg+ the above inequality is the contraposition of (9).
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 5.2
We must have w−(1) < w(0) < w+(1) if good agents are to follow the standard normal
strategy. Due to the non-negativity assumption, we may without loss of generality assume
w−(1) = 0. We will show that if U
g
0 ≥ (1 + q+)U b0 , then the participation constraint for good
agents, (5), implies that for bad agents, (7). We hence assume
q+w+(1) + (1− q+)w(0) ≥ (1− β)U g0 .
From Theorem 4.4 we know that (7) is satisfied at α = 0 when w(0) ≥ (1−β)U b0 . Conversely,
if w(0) < (1− β)U b0 , we find
q+w+(1) ≥ (1− β)U g0 − (1− q+)w(0)
≥ (1 + q+)(1− β)U b0 − (1− q+)(1− β)U b0 = (1− β)U b0 ,
so that the participation constraint for bad agents is satisfied at α = 1.
Conversely, it is easy to see that if U g0 < (1 + q+)U b0 , a non-negative contract can be con-
structed that satisfies the participation constraint for good agents, (5), but violates that for
bad agents, (7). This completes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5.4
We consider the two regimes separately, omitting the index m = a, c.
Aggressive Regime: From the proof of Theorem 3.3 we know that in the aggressive
regime, the system is entirely described by the agent’s current type, θ(t). Denote by V (θg)
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respectively V (θb) the principal’s value function in either state. Using the Markov transition
matrix derived in the proof of Theorem 3.3 we find
V (θg) = vg + βV (θg)
V (θb) = vb + β {λV (θb) + (1− λ)V (θg)}
Combining these two equations it is easy to see that
V (θb)− V (θg) = v
b − vg
1− βλ .
Since initially, the distribution of the agent’s type is given by pi0, the principal’s overall value
function is hence given by
V (θg) + (1− pi0) (V (θb)− V (θg)) = v
g
1− β +
1− pi0
1− βλ
(
vb − vg) ,
which was to be shown.
Conservative Regime: From the proof of Theorem 3.3 we know that in the conservative
regime, the system is entirely described by the principal’s belief, pi(t), which can only take
on the values pi0 or one. Denote by V (pi0) respectively V (1) the principal’s value function in
either state. Analogous to the aggressive case we find
V (1) = vg + βV (1)
V (pi0) = pi0vg + (1− pi0)vb + β {λV (pi0) + (1− λ)V (1)}
Combining these two equations it is easy to see that
V (pi0)− V (1) = (1− pi0)(v
b − vg)
1− βλ .
Since initially, the distribution of the agent’s type is given by pi0, the principal’s overall value
function is simply given by
V (pi0) = V (1) + (V (pi0)− V (1)) = v
g
1− β +
1− pi0
1− βλ
(
vb − vg) ,
39
which is what had to be shown.
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